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Canadian Discord Over the Charlottetown
Accord: The Constitutional War to Win
Quebec
I. Introduction
"Do you agree that the Constitution of Canada should be re-
newed on the basis of the agreement reached on August 28, 1992 -
Yes or No?"' This was the question posed to the citizens of Canada
in a nation-wide referendum held on October 26, 1992.2
The agreement of August 28, 1992, known as the Charlottetown
Accord, proposed a package of sixty amendments to Canada's Con-
stitution.3 Though the Accord addressed issues ranging from aborigi-
nal self-rule to the establishment of new provinces, the heart of the
agreement was a collection of provisions designed to keep Quebec
from seceding from Canada.4
The natural isolation of French-speaking Quebec from English-
speaking Canada has its origins in the colonial period of North
America. 5 The rift has persisted to modern times along language and
cultural lines, with the possibility of Quebec's secession never far
from the front of Canadian consciousness.6 When Canada severed its
last legal ties with Great Britain in 1982 with a new constitution, it
did so without Quebec's consent, the only province of Canada's ten
not to approve.
7
1. Terrance Wills, Straight Answers to Your Big Questions; A Plain Guide to the Ref-
erendum, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 17, 1992, at B4.
2. Id.
3. Martin W.G. King, Canada's Prime Minister Faces Crisis After Referendum, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 5, 1992, at A29.
4. Why Canada is Still There, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1992, at E2. The elements of the
Charlottetown Accord not related to Quebec are not intended to be dismissed as unimportant
in this Comment. They address substantial concerns. However, the primary purpose in drafting
the agreement, and the public's foremost consideration in voting on it, was the Quebec issue.
Id.
5. In a recent book on the modern constitutional crisis over Quebec, the editor comments
on the extent of historical inertia that has brought Canada to the critical juncture of 1992:
"Indeed, the current constitutional crisis in Canada is so deeply rooted in past events that it is
hard to find a reasonable cutoff point in providing historical background for the story." R.
Kent Weaver, Constitutional Conflict in Canada, in THE COLLAPSE OF CANADA? 1, 4 (R.
Kent Weaver ed., 1992) [hereinafter Conflict in Canada]. This Comment is not intended to be
an exhaustive Canadian history, but it will discuss the cultural and constitutional past to the
extent necessary to put the Charlottetown Accord in a meaningful context.
6. R. Kent Weaver, Political Institutions and Canada's Constitutional Crisis, in THE
COLLAPSE OF CANADA? 7 (R. Kent Weaver ed., 1992) [hereinafter Political Institutions].
7. See infra text accompanying note 85.
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This uneasy and unnatural state of confederation has persisted
to the present, despite repeated attempts to bring Quebec into the
constitutional fold.8 The reason for Quebec's aversion to placing it-
self under formal federal control by signing the 1982 constitution is
the same for its continuing flirtation with secession and sovereignty:
Quebec desperately wants to preserve its distinctive French language
culture.9 Quebec's desire for greater internal autonomy, free from
central interference, embodies the classic federal struggle, a struggle
which must end in either secession or compromise. 10 The compro-
mise that was the Charlottetown Accord was soundly defeated by
Canadians inside and outside of Quebec on October 26, 1992."
The constitution would not be changed, and the Quebec crisis
would linger. This Comment will analyze Canada's constitutional
crisis over Quebec with a close look at the present, and a searching
gaze to both the past and the future. Part II of this Comment dis-
cusses the historical underpinning of the modern Anglo-Franco rift
that is at the core of Canada's persisting constitutional impasse. Part
III discusses the complicated story of a decade's failed constitutional
bargaining that has led to the critical juncture of the Charlottetown
Accord. Part IV details the adoption of the Charlottetown Accord,
the Accord's proposed amendments to the Constitution, and the legal
arguments against those amendments. Part V offers some explana-
tions for the failure of the Charlottetown Accord, and some possible
implications of that failure for the future of Canada. Finally, Part
VI offers some concluding remarks on the recent constitutional his-
tory of Canada.
II. History of Anglo-Franco Relations in Canada
A. Colonial Conflict
The current internal conflict that threatens to break Canada
into two nations has its roots in an earlier contest between two Euro-
pean nations. The competing colonial agendas of Great Britain and
France left a legacy of cultural division that has survived long after
the departure of both countries from the North American continent.
France made the first bid for North America in 1534, when
Jacques Cartier claimed the continent on present-day Canada's At-
lantic shore. 2 This early venture was short-lived though, for when
Cartier's "gold" proved to be iron pyrites, France abandoned her
8. See infra text accompanying notes 102, 168.
9. See infra text accompanying note 113.
10. Keith G. Banting, If Quebec Separates: Restructuring Northern North America, in
THE COLLAPSE OF CANADA? 159, 159-61 (R. Kent Weaver ed., 1992).-,
11. Anthony Wilson-Smith, What Happens Next, MCLEAN'S, Nov. 2, 1992, at 12.
12. DESMOND MORTON. A SHORT HISTORY OF CANADA 16 (1983).
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claim for seventy years.18
When Samuel de Champlain came to the St. Lawrence River
Basin in the dawn of the seventeenth century, the French were in
North America to stay."' New France was built not on gold, but on
the fur trade. 5 As fur supplies were depleted in the area immedi-
ately surrounding the St. Lawrence River Basin, New France ex-
panded westward across modern Canada, and to the south along the
Ohio and Mississippi rivers.' 6 This expansion made inevitable the en-
suing conflict with Great Britain.
1 7
With the rise of capitalism in 1650, England adopted a policy of
aggressive colonialism.' 8 This policy produced two British efforts
that contributed to England's eventual supremacy in North America.
The first was an enforced settlement of the colonies, by which
thousands of "rouges, vagrants and those who have no way of liveli-
hood" were forcibly translocated to America to work the English
plantations.' 9 The second effort was a massive military buildup
which saw the British Navy swell from 39 ships in 1649 to 229 in
1660.20
In 1664, England seized New Holland (present-day New York)
from the Netherlands.2' This acquisition gave the British an unbro-
ken string of colonies from Spanish Florida to New France, and the
stage was set for the series of Anglo-Franco wars that would ulti-
mately result in English dominion over North America east of the
Mississippi. 22
The first round of conflict, which lasted from 1689 to 1713, en-
ded with substantial concessions of land to the British. 23 These con-
cessions foretold a willingness of France to sacrifice Canada that
would be more fully realized in 1763.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 16-17.
15. Id. at 17.
16. STANLEY B. RYERSON. THE FOUNDING OF CANADA 130 (1963).
17. Id. at 132.
18. Id. at 134.
19. Id. at 135. While the English Atlantic seaboard colonies grew rapidly during this
period, the development of New France was painfully slow, due in part to France's single-
minded concentration on the fur trade, and to a lack of ice-free ports during a great portion of
every year. Id. at 136.
20. RYERSON, supra note 16, at 135.
21. Id. at 136.
22. Id. at 136-37.
23. Id. at 147. One of the French concessions of 1713 was the Atlantic peninsular region
of Acadia. Id. at 147. The 8,000 French Canadians who remained in Acadia would suffer
terribly at the hands of the British in the second Anglo-Franco conflict of 1745-1763. In 1755,
more than 6,000 French Acadians were deported as their homesteads were burned. RYERSON,
supra note 16, at 186. As an isolated wartime event, the Acadian tragedy's importance in
modern times may be only a small seam in a greater cultural unravelling, but its effect on
contemporary French Canadians was clear: "The tragedy of the Acadians burned deep into
the consciousness of the French Canadians on the St. Lawrence, and was not forgotten when
later their own survival as a national community was at stake." Id. at 187.
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The fall of New France under English rule was to be expected
even before the "French and Indian Wars" of 1756-1763. Authori-
ties in Paris considered abandoning the colony as late as 1755.24
With the fall of Montreal in 1760, New France became occupied
territory. 6 New France was formally surrendered to Great Britain
three years later under the Treaty of Paris."
B. British Rule
The advent of British rule in northern North America began the
French Canadian struggle for self-preservation - a struggle which,
to the present day, serves to divide Canada. This factor of cultural
separation imbues the English conquest described in the previous
section with new meaning: "It was widely claimed at the time that
Britain had warred on France in order to spread . . . 'the inestima-
ble benefits of political liberty and the Protestant religion.' "2 This
seed of anglicization, planted in a colonial war, would not grow in
New France. When the British assumed power, "Quebec retained a
strongly entrenched population that was French-speaking, passion-
ately Catholic, and utterly determined to avoid assimilation with its
English-speaking Protestant conquerors.""
The early years of English rule in Canada were characterized
by an ostensible effort by the British to conciliate the French
Canadians, coupled with a hidden agenda of anglicization. The im-
position of a minority Anglo-colonial ruling class on a majority of
French Canadians soon led to demands for an elected assembly.29
This demand was granted by the Constitutional Act of 1791, which
also served to divide the Province of Canada into two provinces: Up-
per Canada, corresponding to modern-day Ontario; and Lower Ca-
nada, modern Quebec. 30
Even the grant of representative government had an ulterior
purpose. A major British proponent of the measure argued that the
creation of Lower Canada with an elected assembly would be "the
best means of conciliating the French inhabitants, as they would, by
this measure, be made sensible that there was no intention to force
24. Id. at 191.
25. Id. at 196.
26. Political Institutions, supra note 6, at 17. At the Paris negotiations, France was
faced with a choice in their bargaining: Canada, or the tiny Carribean sugar island of
Guadaloupe. France chose Guadaloupe. RYERSON, supra note 16, at 196-97.
27. RYERSON, supra note 16, at 199.
28. Political Institutions, supra note 6, at 18. The British immediately took two steps to
redefine their new colony. First, the sprawling, ill-defined vastness on New France was cut
down to a smaller area along the St. Lawrence, roughly corresponding to the area now repre-
sented by eastern Ontario and Quebec. Second, New France was renamed the "Province of
Quebec." RYERSON, supra note 16, at 201.
29. RYERSON, supra note 16, at 204.
30. Id. at 227.
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British laws upon them.""1 At the same time, the same man openly
expressed his hope that an elected assembly "would in the long run
lead to the complete anglicizing of the French Canadians." 2
The actual effect of an elected assembly was just the opposite,
and it was in the new parliamentary arena that two strikingly mod-
ern issues first arose. First, the assembly became a forum for airing
French Canadian grievances against English rule.33 Second, the very
first Lower Canadian Assembly, that of modern Quebec, saw a bitter
conflict over "the use of French equally with English as an official
language.'"'
French Canadian nationalism continued to grow in the early
1800s. The English-speaking merchant class called for the angli-
cizing of the French Canadian community, and, with the help of the
British colonial governors, sought to "impose their own minority rule
in defiance of the elective Assembly. 35 This campaign met with a
"wave of French Canadian national resentment." 36
By 1837, Anglo-Franco tensions in Lower Canada had reached
a new peak.3 7 The predominantly Francophone assembly had de-
manded executive power in the "Ninety-Two Resolutions" of 1834.38
Great Britain rejected this demand and instructed its English gover-
nor to "govern the colony with or without an elected Assembly."3 9
The armed rebellion that broke out in 1837 was easily snuffed out by
the British in Quebec and in St. Eustache north of Montreal. 0 The
effect of this failed rebellion on the French Canadian psyche was
clear: "As in 1760, the Canadiens had been defeated. The bitterness
of a second conquest engulfed the Lower Canadian leaders, leaving
them paralyzed and despairing. Others would have to find strength
and ingenuity to survive.""
By the 1860s England was weary of the financial burden of Ca-
nada and concerned with the rising power of Germany in Europe.
4 2
It was in this eagerness to free itself from North American entangle-
31. Id. at 229.
32. Id.
33. RYERSON, supra note 16, at 229.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 278.
36. Id. This rise in French Canadian nationalism, in response to the concurrent English
campaign to "unfrenchify" Quebec, saw the founding, in 1806, "of the newspaper Le
Canadien as organizer and agitator for the popular cause." Id. at 279-80.
37. MORTON, supra note 12, at 27. Massive immigration produced, for the first time, a
landless laboring class. Id. at 26. In 1832, there was widespread belief that the British had
deliberately planned the cholera plague that had claimed hundreds of French Canadian lives.
Id. at 27.
38. Id. at 27.
39. Id.
40. MORTON, supra note 12, at 28.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 86.
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ments that the British Parliament united the four provinces of Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Quebec into the new Dominion
of Canada, by the British North America Act of 1867."' Quebec's
fear of anglicization was at once a source of reluctance to join the
new confederation, and an even greater motivation to do just that;
the prevailing consensus was that only by joining Canada could the
French identity be preserved against the expansionist tendencies of
the United States." British rule was in effect over, but Quebec's pri-
mary consideration of preserving its distinct society remained intact.
C. Modern Conflict
Not even the unifying power of the First World War could
bring the French and English elements of Canada together in the
early twentieth century. French Canadians' popular disinterest in the
war was voiced by the sentiment of the Francophone leadership, who
said that "[t]he real enemies of French Canada were not the
Germans, . . . 'but English-Canadian anglicizers, the Ontario in-
triguers, or Irish priests.'- 5
Although Canada was not truly unified as the twentieth century
wore on, it was not until the late 1960s that the modern signs of a
Canada torn apart began to appear. It was in the late 60s and early
70s that the present factions crystallized into separatists and federal-
ists, both inside and outside of Quebec."6
Pierre Trudeau, a Francophone native of Quebec, became Prime
Minister of Canada in 1968 on a platform of Canadian unity. 7 Tru-
deau rejected the idea of special status for Quebec. Instead, he envi-
sioned Canada as a homeland for both French and English, and he
acted on this vision with the passage of the Official Languages Act
of 1969.48
Meanwhile, in Quebec, Robert Bourassa rose to leadership of
the federalist Parti Liberal.49 In direct opposition to Bourassa's fed-
43. Clark R. Cahow, Comparative Insights into Constitutional History: Canada, The
Critical Years, in RESHAPING CONFEDERATION 33, 47 (Paul Davenport & Richard H. Leach
eds., 1984).
44. KENNETH MCNAUGHT. THE HISTORY OF CANADA, 133 (1970). Three hundred and
thirty-three years after Jacques Cartier claimed Canada for France, it was another Cartier
who urged his fellow French Canadians into the new Confederation. George Etienne Cartier
insisted that it was "only within a new political nation of British North America that the
cultural nation of French Canada could be safe from American conquest or English assimila-
tion." MORTON, supra note 12, at 14.
45. MORTON, supra note 12, at 149.
46. Id. at 252-53.
47. Id. at 252.
48. Id. The Official Languages Act provided for bilingual districts, "and for the trans-
formation of the federal government and its agencies into institutions where Canadians of
either official language could find service and employment." Id.
49. MORTON, supra note 12, at 253.
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eralist agenda was the Parti Qu6b6cois, which was created in 1968.50
The Parti Qu6b6cois promoted souveraint-association, political
sovereignty combined with economic association with Canada, and
for the first time legitimized the idea of Quebec's secession.
The separatist cause that was pursued politically by the Parti
Quebecois spilled over to the public, who resorted to demonstrations
and rioting in 1969.52 The nationalistic rioting of 1969 proved to be
only a prelude to the volatile events of 1970, and a crisis that fully
exposed the depth of the modern Anglo-Franco division. On October
5, 1970, a British Trade Commissioner was kidnapped in Montreal. 3
Responsibility for this act, and for the subsequent abduction of Bou-
rassa Labor Minister Pierre Laporte, was claimed by a separatist
terrorist group, the Front du Liberation du Quebec.54 Such was the
intensity of public sympathy for the terrorists that Trudeau declared
an apprehended insurrection in Quebec and proclaimed the War
Measures Act.58 Ten thousand federal troops were sent into Mon-
treal, Quebec, and Ottawa.56
When the strangled body of Pierre Laporte was found a few
days later, the "terrorists were no longer heroes."57 The "appre-
hended insurrection" of 1970 was over, but the Parti Quebecois and
the idea of Quebec sovereignty grew. In 1990, for the first time,
Quebec's secession from Canada attained majority support in
Quebec.
58
The history of Anglo-Franco tensions in Canada, from the
founding nation days of New France, through the British subjuga-
tion, to the October crisis of 1970, is long and complex. It would be
a mistake to underestimate the relevance of these seemingly anti-
quated struggles to the present constitutional impasse. After all, the
motto of Quebec still looks to the past: Je me souviens - "I
remember. 59
III. 1980-1990: The Constitutional Prelude to the Charlottetown
Accord
If the greater issue of Quebec separatism was shaped by over
50. St~phane Dion, Explaining Quebec Nationalism, in THE COLLAPSE OF CANADA? 77,
79 (R. Kent Weaver ed., 1992).
51. Id.
52. MORTON, supra note 12, at 253.
53. - Id. at 254.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 254-255.
56. Id. at 255.
57. MORTON, supra note 12, at 255.
58. Dion, supra note 50, at.79. The Parti Quebecois won control of Quebec's provincial
legislature in 1976, and remained in power until 1985, when Bourassa's Liberal Party regained
control. Id. at 80.
59. Id. at 78.
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300 years of cultural division, it has been the constitutional wran-
gling since 1980 that has more directly precipitated the Charlot-
tetown Accord. Twice during the 1980s, with the patriation of the
constitution in 1982, and the Meech Lake Accord in 1987, attempts
were made to secure Quebec's position in the Canadian Confedera-
tion.60 Quebec rejected Canada in 1982, and Canada rejected Que-
bec in 1987.61 Though both projects failed to solidify Quebec's posi-
tion in Canada, they did shape the constitutional issues that would
be addressed by the Charlottetown Accord in 1992. In the referen-
dum on the Charlottetown Accord, Quebec and Canada rejected
each other.62
A. The Patriation of Canada's Constitution
The catalyst for Canada's persisting constitutional strife over
Quebec came in the form of a 1980 sovereignty referendum in the
province. The purpose of the referendum was to "mobilize public
opinion within Quebec and thereby pressure the federal Government
to negotiate a legal solution with the Quebec Government." '63
The referendum was organized by the separatist, Francophonic
Parti Quebecois government of Quebec."' Their separatist proposal
offered a deliberately moderate choice in an effort to win broad-
based support.6 5 In truth, this was not a referendum on sovereignty,
but a plebiscite asking for a mandate to negotiate for political sover-
eignty, coupled with continued economic association with the rest of
Canada."6
Federalists inside and outside of the province were trying
equally hard to defeat the sovereignty referendum. Prime Minister
Pierre Trudeau promised Quebec voters that "a 'no' to sovereignty-
association was not a vote for the status quo, and that the defeat of
the referendum would be followed by constitutional change to better
accommodate Quebec's aspirations. '6 7 Federalism won decisively in
the May 20, 1980 referendum by a popular vote of 59.5% to
40.5 % .8 However, the Parti Quebecois had succeeded in provoking
federal negotiations, for immediately following the referendum's de-
60. See infra text accompanying notes 63-100, 101-28.
61. Id.
62. Bob McKenzie, Next Election Could See Rise of Separatists in Parliament, To-
RONTO STAR, Oct. 27, 1992, at B4.
63. Edward McWhinney, The Constitutional Patriation Project. 1980-1982, 32 AM. J.
COMP. L. 241, 242 (1984).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 243.
66. Id. The Parti Qu6b6cois still offered sovereignty-association, and actual separation
would only follow a second referendum held for the final choice of Quebec voters. Id.
67. Peter W. Hogg, The New Canadian Constitution, 32 AM. J. COMp. L. 221 (1984).
68. Id.
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feat, Trudeau presented the constitutional patriation project.6 9 The
constitutional war to win Quebec, which may have been lost at
Charlottetown, had begun.
By "patriating" their constitution, Canadians eliminated the
last vestigal authority of England's Parliament over their country. 0
Though Canada became a truly sovereign nation in 1931 by the
Statute of Westminster, "authority to amend the Constitution re-
mained in London due to an inability of the provinces to agree on a
Canadian alternative. '7 1 This "Canadianization" of the 1867 consti-
tution, the adoption of an autonomous constitutional amending
formula, and the creation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms were the three major elements of the 1982 patriation
package .
72
In the early stages of the patriation project, Trudeau was true
to his promise to negotiate with Quebec and the other provinces on
the specifics of constitutional change. The Prime Minister met with
the ten provincial premiers throughout the summer and early fall of
1980, but failed to achieve any agreement.73
Trudeau then resolved to proceed unilaterally, and on October
6, 1980, the Prime Minister introduced into the Canadian Parlia-
ment the first version of the patriation package.7 ' The package, in-
cluding an autonomous amending formula and the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, was passed by the House of Commons and the Sen-
ate on April 23. and 24, 1981, respectively. 75 This first incarnation of
the patriation package was never sent to England for enactment by
the United Kingdom Parliament, because by this time Trudeau's




By abandoning provincial negotiations and proceeding solely on
the federal level, Trudeau had departed from his promise, made to
Quebec voters before their sovereignty referendum, to amend the
69. McWhinney, supra note 63, at 243.
70. Hogg, supra note 67, at 222.
71. Gil Remillard, The Constitution Act, 1982: An Unfinished Compromise, 32 AM. J.
COMP. L. 269, 279 (1984). This arrangement, requiring Great Britain to amend Canada's
constitution, proved to be a formality, as the English Parliament always acted according to
Canada's wishes in this regard. Id. Canada's constitution, before and after the 1982 patriation,
is actually a British statute, the British North America Act of 1867. McWhinney, supra note
63, at 241. Patriation was significant because it gave Canada sole power to amend that statute.
Id.
72. McWhinney, supra note 63, at 252.
73. Hogg, supra note 67, at 221-22.
74. Id. at 222.
75. Id. The passage of Trudea's package in the federal parliament was a foregone con-
clusion, because in the parliamentary system of government, the chief executive is the head of
the controlling party in the legislative branch. Id.
76. Id.
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Constitution to better accommodate Quebec's aspirations.7 7 Only
two provinces supported the Prime Minister's initiative, and Quebec,
along with two other provinces, had appealed the legitimacy of a
unilateral patriation to the Supreme Court of Canada.78
Two critical questions were presented to the Court: (1) "Was
the consent of the provinces to the proposed amendments required by
law?, and (2) Was the consent of the provinces to the proposed
amendments required by convention?"79 The Court, in a decision of
September 28, 1981, answered no to the first question and yes to the
second.80 In a strictly legal sense, the federal government could pro-
ceed with the patriation with the support of only Ontario and New
Brunswick. 81 However, the Supreme Court added that "such a pa-
triation would be illegitimate because it would violate a constitu-
tional convention requiring patriation to be undertaken with the
agreement of a substantial number of provinces. '"82
In an effort to legitimate the technically legal patriation, Prime
Minister Trudeau again convened with the provincial premiers. 83 By
providing an "override clause" in the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms, and substituting a new constitutional amending formula, Tru-
deau was able to gain the legitimizing support of nine provinces.84
Quebec was the lone dissenter.8 5 Quebec's dissent was rooted in the
two substantive elements of the patriation package - The Charter
of Rights and Freedoms and the new amendment procedure.
The Charter, while guaranteeing the rights of Canadian citi-
zens, "directly challenge[d] the legislative authority of the Quebec
77. See supra text accompanying. note 67. The actual outcome of the 1982 patriation
was not at all what Quebec voters had expected after Prime Minister Trudeau's pre-referen-
dum rhetoric: "At that time Trudeau pledged to renew federalism if the referendum of the
Parti Quebecois was rejected. In Quebec the expression 'renewed federalism' was broadly un-
derstood as synonymous with 'new powers for Quebec in the federation.' Since no gain of that
sort for Quebec was included in the Constitution Act of 1982, many Quebecers felt betrayed
by Trudeau." Dion, supra note 50, at I11.
78. Hogg, supra note 67, at 222-23.
79. Id. at 223. The Supreme Court decision, Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution
[1981], can be found at I S.C.R. 753..
80. Id.
81. Remillard, supra note 71, at 270.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Hogg, supra note 67, at 223. This override provision, commonly known as the "not-
withstanding clause," allows Parliament or a provincial legislature to enact laws that contra-
vene certain provisions of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This override clause provides:
"Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or
of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwith-
standing a provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter." CAN. CONST.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. 1, § 33.
85. Hogg, supra note 67, at 223. In a second appeal to the Supreme Court following the
agreement of the other nine provinces to the patriation, Quebec asked if a "substantial number
of provinces" must include the agreement of Quebec. The Supreme Court held that it did not
in Re Attorney General of Quebec and Attorney General of Canada, 140 D.L.R. (3d) 385
(1982). Remillard, supra note 71, at 271.
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National Assembly in matters of language and education."86 The
language and education rights in the Charter, found in sections 16
through 23, are immune from provincial override through the use of
the notwithstanding clause of section 33. The notwithstanding clause
can be invoked only to override rights found in sections 2 and 7
through 15 of the Charter.8 7 The Charter's language rights ensure
the equality of the French minority outside of Quebec, as well as the
English minority within Quebec. Sections 16 through 23 interfere
with the ability of the Quebec legislature to promote the French lan-
guage, and Parti Quebecois Premier Rene Levesque declared that
"he would never permit Quebec's legislative powers to be tampered
with without his consent. 88
For better or for worse, Quebec's legislative power was impeded
by the Charter. In 1983, Quebec's Superior Court struck down a
Quebec statute that limited the right to an English education to chil-
dren whose parents had received an English education in Quebec. 9
The Court relied on section 1 of the Charter, a section immune to
provincial override, which provides that "a rule of law may only re-
strict a right or liberty in a reasonable way, as that expression is
understood in a free and democratic society." 90
The constitutional amendment procedure adopted by the 1982
patriation was unacceptable to Quebec in two ways. 91 The first
source of Quebec's dissatisfaction involves the right of any province
to opt out of new amendments affecting a "province's legislative au-
thority, property rights, or any other right or privilege."9 Such a
dissenting province is entitled to federal compensation if the amend-
ment pertains to education or culture, so that the province may fund
its alternative program. 93 This opt-out right implicitly recognized
Quebec's unique cultural status by allowing it to pursue alternative
programs in education and culture.94 Quebec was dissatisfied be-
cause federal compensation for the opt-out procedure extended only
to education and culture. Quebec would not be compensated if it
chose to pursue an alternative environmental program, and Quebec's
taxpayers would be paying for the federal amendment Quebec could
86. Remillard, supra note 71, at 271-72.
87. See supra note 84.
88. Remillard, supra note 71, at 270.
89. Id. at 273; Quebec Association of Protestant Schoolboards v. P.G. an Quebec et al,
C.S. 673 (1982).
90. Remillard, supra note 71, at 273 (citing Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I
(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), § 1).
91. Remillard, supra note 71, at 276.
92. Id. (CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. V. (Procedure for Amending Consti-
tution of Canada), § 38).
93. Remillard, supra note 71, at 276 (CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. V (Pro-
cedure for Amending Constitution of Canada), § 40).
94. Remillard, supra note 71, at 276.
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opt out of, as well as the provincially adopted alternative.95 This ap-
petite for provincial autonomy in all areas illustrates the federal
struggle at work in 1982, as well as in the present. The concession of
the right to reject new federal education or culture amendments was
not enough. Quebec wanted complete freedom from federal
interference. -
Quebec's second point of contention over the amending formula
is that the formula makes Quebec vulnerable to changes in federal
institutions such as the Parliament and the Supreme Court.96 Article
42 of the 1982 Constitution Act provides that amendments regarding
the Court and principles of proportionate representation in the
House of Commons must be made according to article 38, and are
not subject to the opt-out procedure of article 40 .97 The effect of
article 42 is that "certain fundamental rules of Canadian federalism
could be modified against the wishes of Quebec, which accounts for
[] 25% of the Canadian population." 98 To Quebec, a province with a
demonstrated aversion to federal interference in provincial matters,
such a possibility was in 1982, and is today, a cause for grave
concern.
When the patriation project went into effect as the Constitution
Act on April 17, 1982, it was without Quebec's consent.99 Far from
accommodating the special concerns of Quebec, the Constitution Act
actually worked against Quebec's interests. Instead of achieving a
major purpose of the project, that of solidifying Quebec's position in
the Confederation, the lone dissenting province was, more than ever,
95. Id. at 277.
96. Id.
97. Id. Article 42 provides, in relevant part:
42(1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada in relation to the following
matters may be made only in accordance with subsection 38(1):
(a) the principle of proportionate representation of the provinces in the
House of Commons prescribed by the Constitution of Canada; .
(b) the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting Senators;
(c) the number of members by which a province is entitled to be repre-
sented in the Senate and the residence qualifications of Senators;
(d) subject to paragraph 41(d), the Supreme Court of Canada ....
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. V (Procedure for Amending Constitution of Ca-
nada), § 42.
98. Remillard, supra note 71, at 277. Article 38 of the 1982 Ccnstitution Act reads, in
relevant part:
38(1) An amendment to the Constitution of Canada may be made by proclama-
tion issued by the Governor General under the Great Seal of Canada where so
authorized by
(a) resolutions of the Senate and House of Commons; and
(b) resolutions of the legislative assemblies of at least two-thirds of the
provinces that have, in the aggregate, according to the then latest general
census, at least fifty percent of the population of all the provinces.
CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. V (Procedure for Amending Constitution of Ca-
nada) § 42.
99. Hogg, supra note 67, at 223-24.
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illuminated as an outsider. 100
B. The Failure at Meech Lake
The 1987 Meech Lake Accord was an attempt to correct the
damage done by the 1982 patriation of the constitution.10 1 When
Brian Mulroney became prime minister of Canada in 1984, he con-
demned Quebec's isolation in 1982, and "committed himself to rein-
tigrate Quebec in the constitution with 'honor and enthusiasm.' "102
To this end, Mulroney convened with the ten provincial
premiers at Meech Lake, and quickly reached an agreement on June
3, 1987.113 Only five years after the constitutional overhaul of 1982,
the Meech Lake Accord purported to further amend Canada's con-
stitution, this time to Quebec's satisfaction. °104
The Meech Lake proposals directly addressed Quebec's sources
of discontent with the Constitution Act of 1982. Quebec was dissat-
isfied with that document because it allowed federal control over
Quebec through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the consti-
tutional amending formula. The Meech Lake proposals, which
sought to accommodate Quebec on those points, represented a dra-
matic shift of power from the federal government to Quebec and the
rest of the provinces.'0 5
Foremost among the Meech Lake proposals was a "distinct soci-
ety" clause recognizing Quebec's unique French language charac-
ter.' 06 This clause, which by Meech Lake would have been added to
the constitution, was more than a formality recognizing a social and
100. Id. at 223.
101. Alan Cairns, Ritual, Taboo and Bias in Constitutional Controversies in Canada,
or Constitutional Talk Canadian Style, 54 SASKATCHEWAN L REV. 121, 123 (1990).
102. Dion, supra note 50, at 112.
103. Id.
104. Quebec's assent was more easily extracted in 1987 than in 1982. In 1982, it was
the secessionist Parti Quebecois government that had refused to agree with the Constitution
Act. In 1987, however, Quebec's Premier was Robert Bourassa, whose Parti Liberal had
wrested control of Quebec's government from the Parti Quebecois in 1985. The federalist Bou-
rassa conditioned Quebec's assent on a modest five-point list of demands, and his terms were
essentially met by the Meech Lake Accord. Dion, supra note 50, at 112.
105. Timothy S.B. Danson, Nothing but Tears; The 1987 Constitutional Accord, 13
QUEEN'S L. J. 110, 112 (1988).
106. Dion, supra note 50, at 112. The distinct society clause of the Meech Lake Accord
provided, in relevant part:
2. (1) The Constitution of Canada shall be interpreted in a manner consistent
with
(a) the recognition that the existence of French-speaking Canadians, cen-
tered in Quebec but also present elsewhere in Canada, and English-
speaking Canadians, concentrated outside -Quebec but also present in
Quebec, constitute a fundamental characteristic of Canada; and
(b) the recognition that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct
society.
The Constitutional Amendment, 1987, § 1.
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historical fact." 7 It was to be an interpretive tool for the courts in
reviewing Quebec language and education legislation.' 08 The distinct
society clause was Francophonic Quebec's answer to the language
rights guaranteed by the 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
As discussed earlier, the language rights in the Charter are im-
mune from provincial override through use of the notwithstanding
clause. 109 However, article 1 of the Charter makes it clear that the
rights set forth in the Charter are in no way absolute. Article 1 pro-
vides: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free
and democratic society."" 0 Without a distinct society clause, courts
have construed article 1 narrowly against the provinces, so that stat-
utes cannot easily limit Charter rights. This was the case in Quebec
Association of Protestant School Boards v. P.G. an Quebec et al,
described in the previous subsection."' There, the Quebec Superior
Court held that the Quebec statute limiting English educations to
children of parents who had received English educations in Quebec
was not a reasonable limit on Charter rights under article 1." Since
minority education rights are set out in section 23 of the Charter, a
section which cannot be overridden with the notwithstanding clause,
the Quebec statute was void.
With a distinct society clause, however, statutes such as the one
described above could be held to be reasonable limits on Charter
rights under article 1. This ability to override language rights, which
would otherwise be secure from the notwithstanding clause, is what
Francophonic Quebecers hoped to gain through a distinct society
clause."1 3
The Meech Lake Accord, in addition to satisfying Quebec's
problems with the Charter, also made broad concessions regarding
constitutional amendments. Quebec rejected articles 38 and 40 of
the Constitution Act, because provinces opting out of national shared
cost programs in areas other than education and culture would not
receive federal compensation." 4 The Meech Lake Accord allowed a
province to opt out of any national shared cost program, and still
107. Danson, supra note 105, at 112.
108. Deborah Coyne, Constitutional Reform and The Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
55 SASKATCHEWAN L. REV. 203, 211 (1991).
109. See supra note 84.
110. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 1 (emphasis added).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
112. Id.
113. Coyne, supra note 108, at 211.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
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receive federal compensation for its own alternative plan.118
Quebec's second source of dissatisfaction with the 1982 amend-
ment procedure was centered on article 42, which allowed the possi-
bility of federal institutions such as Parliament and the Supreme
Court to be changed without Quebec's consent."" Meech Lake pur-
ported to change this by requiring the unanimous consent of all ten
provinces to constitutional amendments regarding Parliament and
the Supreme Court." 7 This proposal would have given Quebec, as
well as the other nine provinces, the equivalent of a veto on any arti-
cle 42 matter.
The Meech Lake Accord seemed to be the answer to all of Que-
bec's problems. Indeed, in becoming the first province to ratify
Meech Lake on June 23, 1987, Quebec had signalled its willingness
to rejoin Canada's constitutional family. 1 But in these early days
following the agreement of the premiers, Prime Minister Mulroney
was premature in claiming that Quebec had been restored to the
constitution. 9 For the Meech Lake Accord to be amended into the
constitution, it had to be ratified by the federal Parliament and all
ten provincial legislatures by 1990.120
Meech Lake came under increasingly greater criticism as the
June 1990 ratification deadline approached. The secretive procedure
by which eleven men had written the Accord was criticized as elitist
and unresponsive to the will of the common Canadian."'
The substantive elements of the Accord came under even
greater fire. Former Prime Minister Trudeau and others excoriated
the distinct society clause, which they believed would lead to an ero-
sion of Charter language rights for the Anglophone minority within
Quebec and the Francophone minority outside of Quebec. 22 The
Meech Lake amending proposals were seen as a deadly blow to cen-
tral power through an unacceptable increase in provincial power.
The power to opt out of all federal shared cost programs with federal
compensation, while attractive to the premiers at Meech Lake, was a
power that could end such uniform, national programs such as child
care. 123 Similarly, many predicted that the provincial veto right over
article 42 amendments, amendments affecting proportionate
115. Bryan Schwartz, Refashioning Meech Lake, 17 MANITOBA L.J. 19, 40 (1987-
1988).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
117. Schwartz, supra note 115, at 42.
118. Id. at 21.
119. Dion, supra note 50, at 112.
120. Id.
121. Danson, supra note 105, at 110. Parliament and the several provinces to ultimately
ratify Meech Lake held desultory public hearings on the accord, at which "independent" wit-
nesses appeared to invariably support the Accord. Schwartz, supra note 115, at 20-21.
122. Political Institutions, supra note 6, at 62.
123. Danson, supra note 105, at 119-120.
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represenation and the Supreme Court, would lead to paralysis on the
federal level.'
24
In the end, two provinces failed to ratify the Accord by the June
1990 deadline. 2 " The Meech Lake Accord, which had held great
promise for Quebec, was dead. In truth, the rejection of the 1987
deal was deeper than the dissent of two provinces. A poll taken six
months after the ratification deadline revealed that "nearly seventy
percent of Canadians outside Quebec would not endorse further con-
cessions to Quebec, even if it meant that the province would
separate."' 26
It was not surprising that separatist sentiment did soar in Que-
bec following the collapse of Meech Lake. 27 The nationalistic fervor
that had subsided since the defeat of the 1980 sovereignty referen-
dum had returned. 28 It is ironic that this renewed nationalism in
Quebec was inspired by the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, an
agreement that only three years before had offered hope for constitu-
tional unity in Canada.
IV. The Charlottetown Accord
Work on the Charlottetown Accord began soon after the failure
of Meech Lake. Like the Meech Lake Accord, Charlottetown had as
its primary objective an end to the constitutional rift with Quebec.
With such a goal, it was necessary to return to the core reasons for
Quebec's constitutional disenchantment: the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms and its lack of a distinct society clause; and the 1982
amending formula as it relates to opting out of national shared cost
programs, and changes to federal institutions such as Parliament and
the Supreme Court.
The Charlottetown Accord addressed these substantive issues
differently from Meech Lake. It would have been foolish to try a
failed approach a second time. Indeed, the Charlottetown Accord
differed from Meech Lake in almost every respect, procedurally and
substantively, except one: its ultimate failure.
A. Procedural aspects of the Charlottetown Accord
From the very beginning, the moving forces behind the Charlot-
124. Id. at 126.
125. Dion, supra note 50, at 113. Newfoundland and Manitoba were the provinces who
blocked the Meech Lake Accord. Both provinces had voted new governments into power since
1987. In Manitoba, a native Canadian legislator prevented Meech Lake from coming to a vote
through procedural delays. This was significant in light of aboriginal frustration with the ac-
cord's silence on aboriginal rights. Political Institutions, supra note 6, at 63.
126. Dion, supra note 50, at 113-14.
127. Political Institutions, supra note 6, at 25.
128. Conflict in Canada, supra note 5, at 3.
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tetown Accord were determined to avoid the errors that inspired
such public aversion to the Meech Lake Accord. Meech Lake was
vilified as elitist for the secrecy with which a small group of high
ranking government officials sought to adopt it.'" 9 By contrast, the
evolution of the Charlottetown Accord could not have been more
public and inclusive of special interests. The Special Joint Commit-
tee on a Renewed Canada travelled across the country seeking views
on the early proposals. 30 This committee received 3,000 submissions
and heard testimony from 700 individuals.1 3'
Recommendations from this committee served as the basis for
discussion at the first of the familiar meetings between the Prime
Minister and the provincial premiers. 3 2 Also present at this first
meeting, held March 12, 1992 in Ottawa, were representatives of
two groups that had been excluded from the Meech Lake meetings,
the territories and Canada's aboriginal peoples. 133 These negotiations
proceeded throughout the spring and summer of 1992 in various cit-
ies across Canada, until consensus was reached at Charlottetown on
August 28, 1992.11"
Far more important than Charlottetown's adoption process was
its ratification procedure, the means by which the August 28 agree-
ment would be amended into the Constitution. As with the Meech
Lake Accord, the Charlottetown Accord required the ratification of
all the provinces and the federal Parliament.1 35 Unlike Meech Lake,
however, the populace of each province would control its legislature's
ratification action through its response to a referendum on the
Charlottetown Accord. 36 With a simple yes or no vote, the citizens
129. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
130. Canada Votes '92; Consensus Report on the Constitution, Preface, TORONTO
STAR, Sept. 21, 1992, at A12 [hereinafter Canada Votes].
131. Id. During this same period, all the provinces and territories "created forums for
public consultation on constitutional matters." Id. The public was further informed of the
issues by a series of six televised national conferences between January and March of 1992.
These programs featured discussions on possible constitutional reform among experts, advo-
cacy groups, and citizens. Id.
132. Id.
133. Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., Woe Canada; Separation Anxiety North of the Border,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. I, 1992, at 85.
134. Canada Votes, supra note 130, at A 12. The agreement of August 28, 1992, entitled
Consensus Report on the Constitution: Charlottetown, represented the initial consensus on
proposed constitutional change. This raw agreement was eventually reworked into the Draft
Legal Text of the Charlottetown Accord, October 9, 1992 [hereinafter Draft Legal Text].
This second document, which was mailed to every Canadian household before the referendum,
is what is cited in this Comment.
135. Canadian Voters Reject Reforms; Constitutional Plan's Fall a Blow to Efforts to
Preserve Unity, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 27, 1992, at IA [hereinafter Plan's Fall].
136. Id. In theory, the referendum was a non-binding plebiscite. A provincial legislature
could ratify the Accord even if the public rejected it in the referendum. However, Prime Min-
ister Mulroney, who desperately wanted the Accord ratified, made the policy that the will of
the people would determine the fate of the Charlottetown Accord. Mulroney said that it would
be " 'morally unacceptable' for a provincial legislature to pass the reforms after rejection by its
voters." Id.
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of Canada decided if their constitution would be amended on the
basis of the agreement reached on August 28, 1992 at
137Charlottetown.
B. The substantive proposals of the Charlottetown Accord regard-
ing Quebec
The broad agreement that was ultimately reached as the
Charlottetown Accord had begun as a package narrowvly focused on
accommodating Quebec.1 8' However, aboriginal leaders and repre-
sentatives from the western provinces had their own demands, and
the scope of the agreement was expanded to oblige them. The results
of these accommodations were provisions for aboriginal self-rule and
a reformed Senate in Parliament." 9 Still, the heart of the deal was
the Quebec question, and the now familiar issues were confronted
yet again, each with a new approach.
1. Recognition of Quebec as a Distinct Society.-The
Charlottetown Accord recognized Quebec's distinctive French lan-
guage culture, but quite differently from the distinct society clause
of the more narrowly focused Meech Lake Accord. 140 As a result of
the input from a greater variety of interest groups, the Charlot-
tetown Accord melded this distinct society recognition into a more
expansive "Canada Clause."'' In addition to recognizing Quebec as
137. See supra text accompanying footnotes I and 2.
138. Plan's Fall, supra note 135, at IA.
139. Sections I and 35 of the Charlottetown Accord recognized the right of self rule for
aboriginal peoples as one of three orders of government in Canada, along with the federal and
provincial levels. Draft Legal Text, § I, § 29 (Oct. 9, 1992).
Section 4 of the Charlottetown Accord proposed a Senate comprised of six senators from
each province, in place of the current senate which allots senate seats by population. Draft
Legal Text, § 4 (Oct. 9, 1992). This measure was designed to give the sparsely populated
western provinces equal footing with the highly populated provinces in one of the two houses of
Parliament. Wills, supra note 1, at B4.
140. See supra note 106.
141. The Canada Clause reads, in full:
2(1) The Constitution of Canada, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, shall be interpreted in a manner consistent with the following funda-
mental characteristics:
(a) Canada is a democracy committed to a parliamentary and federal
system of government and to the rule of law;
(b) the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, being the first peoples to govern
this land, have the right to promote their languages, cultures and tradi-
tions and to ensure the integrity of their societies, and their governments
constitute one of three orders of government in Canada;
(c) Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society, which includes a
French-speaking majority, a unique culture and a civil law tradition;
(d) Canadians and their governments are committed to the vitality and
development of official language minority communities throughout
Canada;
(e) Canadians are committed to racial and ethnic equality in a society
that includes citizens from many lands who have contributed, and con-
tinue to contribute, to the building of a strong Canada that reflects its
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a distinct society, the Canada Clause enumerated several other char-
acteristics of Canada to aid the courts in interpreting the Constitu-
tion.142 Some of these enumerated characteristics included the recog-
nition of racial, gender, and ethnic equality.
148
2. The right of a province to opt out of a national shared cost
program.-Quebec's desire for greater provincial autonomy is fully
manifested in its wish to pursue its own governmental programs in-
stead of participating in national shared cost programs. The 1982
Constitution Act gave the provinces the right to opt out of these na-
tional programs, but only provincial alternatives in the areas of edu-
cation and culture would receive federal compensation. 44 Quebec
protested against this provision because financial constraints pre-
cluded opting out of other national shared cost programs. Quebec's
taxpayers would be funding the rejected federal program as well as
the provincially adopted alternative.145 The Meech Lake Accord
went to the opposite extreme on this issue, proposing federal com-
pensation for any shared cost program a province might choose to
opt out of.
146
The Charlottetown Accord proposed a solution midway between
the extremes of the existing 1982 procedure and the failed Meech
Lake alternative. Charlottetown essentially expanded the areas
under which a province could opt out and still receive federal com-
pensation. 47 Those areas, which would have been added to the ex-
cultural and racial diversity;
(f) Canadians are committed to a respect for individual and collective
human rights and freedoms of all people;
(g) Canadians are committed to the equality of female and male persons;
and
(h) Canadians confirm the principle of the equality of the provinces at
the same time as recognizing their diverse characteristics.
(2) The role of the legislature and Government of Quebec to preserve and pro-
mote the distinct society of Quebec is affirmed.
(3) Nothing in this section derogates from the powers, rights, or privileges of the
Parliament or the Government of Canada, or of the legislatures or governments
of the provinces, or of the legislative bodies or governments of the Aboriginal
peoples of Canada, including any powers, rights or privileges relating to
language.
(4) For greater certainty, nothing in this section abrogates or derogates from the
aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.
Draft Legal Text, § 1 (Oct. 9, 1992).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See supra text accompanying note 93.
145. See supra text accompanying note 95.
146. See supra text accompanying note 115.
147. Section 16 of the Charlottetown Accord provides, in relevant part:
(1) The Government of Canada shall provide reasonable compensation to the
government of a province that chooses not to participate in a national shared-
cost program that is established by the Government of Canada after coming into
force of this section in an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, if the province
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isting areas of education and culture, were forestry, mining, tourism,
housing, recreation, and municipal and urban affairs.
1 8
3. Federal Institutions.-Quebec objected to article 42 of the
1982 Constitution Act because it allowed constitutional amendments
to federal institutions such as Parliament and the Supreme Court
without Quebec's consent.'49 The Charlottetown Accord, like Meech
Lake before it, proposed unanimous consent among the provinces to
constitutional amendments regarding the Supreme Court and Parlia-
ment. 150 The rationale for this veto power, which would be enjoyed
by all ten provinces, is that Quebec should be able to protect itself
from changes wrought on central national institutions by the An-
glophone Canadian majority. 5'
The Charlottetown Accord proposed three reforms to Parlia-
ment and the Supreme Court beyond their vulnerability to constitu-
tional amendment. All three of these proposals were designed to pro-
tect Quebec's interests on the federal level. The most striking of
these was the proposal to guarantee Quebec twenty-five percent of
the seats in the House of Commons in perpetuity.'52 Seats in the
House of Commons are determined by population, and though Que-
bec currently has almost twenty-five percent of Canada's population,
that percentage is expected to dwindle. 53 The promise of a quarter
of the Commons seats was partially intended to compensate Quebec
for its reduced presence in the Senate under section 4 of the Charlot-
tetown Accord."
The second of the three reforms to federal institutions was a
unique procedural requirement to be followed in -the reformed Sen-
ate. Section 4 of the Charlottetown Accord provided for a "double
majority" rule that would have protected Quebec from intrusive fed-
eral legislation: "A bill that materially affects the French language
or culture in Canada must, in order to be passed by the Senate, be
approved by a majority of senators voting and by a majority of
French-speaking senators voting."' 55
carries on a program or initiative that is compatible with the national objectives.
Draft Legal Text, § 16 (Oct. 9, 1992).
148. Wills, supra note 1, at B4, noted in Draft Legal Text, § 11 (Oct. 9, 1992).
149. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
150. Draft Legal Text, p. 48, § 32 (Oct. 9, 1992).
151. John Whyte, A Guide to the Charlottetown Accord; Trying to Identify Canada
and its People, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 17, 1992, at B2.
152. Draft Legal Text, § 5 (Oct. 9, 1992).
153. Palmer, supra note 133, at 85.
154. David Vienneau, How the Deal Will Affect Canadians, TORONTO STAR, Oct 18,
1992, at H 1. By eliminating representation by population in the Senate in favor of six senators
per province, Quebec and the other highly populated provinces would have lost senate seats.
See supra note 139.
155. Draft Legal Text, § 4 (Oct. 9, 1992).
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Finally, the Charlottetown Accord would have constitutional-
ized the existing statutory requirement that three of the nine Su-
preme Court judges be appointed from the civil bar of Quebec. 156
C. Legal Criticisms of the Charlottetown Accord
Aside from the complaint that Quebec's twenty-five percent
guarantee in the House of Commons was undemocratic, most of the
Charlottetown Accord escaped serious legal criticism. 157 The glaring
exception to this generalization was the Canada Clause, with its rec-
ognition of Quebec as a distinct society.
1 58
Quebec's desire for a distinct society clause goes far beyond
some need for a ceremonial recognition of its unique French lan-
guage character. Quebec hoped that if the courts could rely on a
constitutionally entrenched distinct society clause as an aid to inter-
preting the constitution, Quebec legislation that might otherwise vio-
late Charter language rights could be upheld as reasonable limits on
those rights.1 59
Pierre Trudeau again came out very strongly against the dis-
tinct society clause. The former prime minister feared exactly what
Quebec Francophones hoped to gain: That a distinct society clause
would be used to promote the French culture at the expense of the
Charter rights of Quebec's Anglophone minority.'6 0 The Canada
Clause, with its distinct society clause and its recognition of Que-
bec's legislative right to promote its French culture, could have com-
pelled the courts to allow just such a result.' 6'
Prime Minister Mulroney, in response to Trudeau's charges,
claimed that the Canada Clause would in no way impinge on the
rights contained in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms."6 2 Mulro-
ney went on to voice a popular legal sentiment that if anything un-
dermines the Charter, it is the notwithstanding clause that Trudeau
agreed to in return for provincial support of the 1982 Constitution
Act.1
6 3
Neither side was fully satisfied with the distinct society clause
156. Draft Legal Text, § 15 (Oct. 9, 1992).
157. Palmer, supra note 133 at 85.
158. See supra note 141.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 109-13.
160. Without Equality, 'One Has a Dictatorship'- Trudeau, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 3,
1992, at C5.
161. See supra note 141.
162. The View From the Top; Wilhelmy Affair Hurt Yes Side, Mulroney Says, But
Referendum Fight Isn't Over, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 7, 1992, at B3 [hereinafter
Wilhelmy Affair).
163. Id. Mulroney pressed for the removal of the notwithstanding clause in the Charlot-
tetown negotiations, but was blocked by the premiers. Mulroney said of this effort: "the pro-
vincial premiers are well aware of the bonanza they were handed by Mr. Trudeau in 1982, and
to say that they were reluctant to give it up is quite an understatement." Id.
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as it was presented in the Charlottetown Accord. The Canada
Clause included the distinct society recognition along with a host of
other characteristics of Canada."" Quebec nationalists complained
that the distinct society clause was diluted by locating it in the con-
text of other fundamental aspects of Canada, such as equality in
race, ethnicity, and gender. 16 Others claimed that by including some
identities, such as race, and excluding others, such as disability, the
Canada Clause created a hierarchy of equality rights under the
Charter: a higher order of rights for those included in the Canada
Clause; and a lower order for those not included. 66
The defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in the October 26,
1992 referendum rendered these arguments moot for the present, but
they are worth consideration should similar proposals be presented in
future constitutional negotiations.
V. Failure and its consequences
A. Why Did Charlottetown Fail?
In the aftermath of the 1982 patriation, an effort that concluded
with Quebec's conspicuous dissent, one writer looked hopefully to the
future for a solution to Canada's constitutional impasse:
Perhaps a generation from now, after another exhausting series
of referenda on the provincial and the federal level, both An-
glophone and Francophone voters will approve a mutually satis-
factory constitution, one that hands down the law to the parlia-
ments of Canada in the name of We the People of Canada.
Perhaps, in a very British show of good sense, parliamentary
sovereigns in Ottawa and all the provinces will reach a sensible
agreement that all of them can explicitly affirm in the name of
the parliamentary sovereigns of Canada. Perhaps Canada will
find its own distinctive path to democratic reconciliation and in-
dividual liberty. 1
67
That hoped-for reconciliation in a mutually acceptable constitu-
tion was not achieved by the Charlottetown Accord. The voters of
Quebec and five other provinces voted no to the referendum question;
they did not agree that the Constitution of Canada should be re-
newed on the basis of the agreement reached on August 28, 1992.168
There are a number of reasons why voters rejected the Chariot-
164. See supra note 141.
165. Whyte, supra note 151, at B2.
166. Id.
167. Bruce A. Ackerman & Robert E. Charney, Canada at the Constitutional Cross-
roads, 34 U. TORONTO L. J. 117, 134 (1984).
168. Wilson-Smith, supra note 11, p. 12. The Charlottetown Accord was defeated in
Quebec, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Colombia. It passed in
Ontario by only two tenths of one percent. Id. at 13.
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tetown Accord. The foremost of those reasons turned on a matter of
perspective: Voters outside of Quebec thought Quebec was given too
much in the Accord, and Quebec voters thought their province re-
ceived too little. 6 " Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa, in an effort to
assure Quebec voters that the Charlottetown Accord was a great
step forward in Quebec's provincial power, said: "[w]ith this legal
text we have the absolute proof that the current government of Que-
bec got more in the negotiations than any other (Quebec) govern-
ment in 125 years."170 Despite such assurances from Bourassa, Que-
bec voters had been given cause to doubt that their premier had
lobbied strongly enough for Quebec's interests in the Charlottetown
negotiations. In late September, it was widely reported in the media
that one of Bourassa's top aides believed that the premier had con-
ceded too much in the constitutional talks.1
71
Voters outside of Quebec believed that the price for appeasing
Quebec was too high. The provincial veto right over constitutional
amendments was seen as tantamount to dismantling the federal gov-
ernment, a concession too extreme even for blocking a possible Que-
bec secession. 72
Aside from the "too much-too little" debate, the depth and
complexity of the Charlottetown deal posed problems of its own.
Sixty diverse-constitutional amendments are simply too many to vote
on with a simple yes or no.' 7 3 A person may reject the entire pack-
age in the basis of a single offensive provision. With a deal with as
many varied proposals as the Charlottetown Accord, it was almost
inevitable that the "No" side would prevail, merely on the basis of a
coalition of differently motivated no votes.174 If this result is to be
avoided in the future, Canada would be wise to proceed incre-
mentally, with a series of narrowly focused referenda on specific con-
stitutional amendments. 75
169. Palmer, supra note 133, at 85.
170. Edison Stewart, Yes Side Sees New Weapon in Legal Text, TORONTO STAR, Oct.
11, 1992, at Al.
171. Barry Came & Nancy Wood et al, Defining Moments: Four Performances that
Shaped the Referendum of 1992, McLEAN'S, Nov.2, 1992, at 26. This was the so-called
"Wilhelmy Affair." A top Bourassa aid told Dianne Wilhelmy that Bourassa had "caved in"
in the negotiations. The conversation, which took place over a cellular telephone, was inter-
cepted and recorded by an electronic eavesdropper. The tape was leaked to the press, and the
damning criticism of Bourassa was made public. Id. at 26.
172. Charles Rusnell, Rhetoric Wears Thin; Debate Does Little to Clarify Issues for
Confused Canadians, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 15, 1992, at C3.
173. King, supra note 3, at A29.
174. Vote Should Be On One Item at a Time, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Nov. 6, 1992, at
B2.
175. This narrowly tailored approach to constitutional reform has already been em-
ployed following the failure of the broad brush Charlottetown Accord. On February 1, 1993,
the Canadian Parliament approved an amendment to the constitution that secures equality of
status for the English (majority) and French (minority) language communities in one province
only, New Brunswick. Edison Stewart, Constitution Soon to Offer Protection for Accadians,
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Finally, the effect of political campaigns on the referendum can-
not be underestimated. For example, Jacques Parizeau, leader of the
separatist Parti Quebecois, repeatedly said that the October 26 vote
was a referendum on the Accord, not on sovereignty. 176 By framing
the referendum this way, Parizeau could credibly claim that Quebec
voters had not rejected sovereignty in the case that the Accord were
approved in Quebec. At the same time, if voters believed Parizeau's
characterization of the referendum, they would feel more comforta-
ble rejecting the Accord even if they did not favor separation. Prime
Minister Mulroney publicly exposed this political tactic by Parizeau,
and predicted that if the Accord failed in Quebec, Parizeau would in
fact claim that Quebec had voted for sovereignty. 1" As it turned
out, Mulroney was correct. When the Accord was defeated in Que-
bec, Parizeau claimed that Quebec had voted for sovereignty, and
said: "The detour they imposed on us is over. We're back on the
way, the highway to sovereignty. Yesterday was the No to end all
Nos."
178
B. Future Implications of the Failure of the Charlottetown Accord
Was Parizeau correct in his claim that a sovereign Quebec is
now inevitable? There are strong indications to both support and re-
fute his claim. The Charlottetown Accord is the third unsuccessful
attempt in ten years to bring Quebec into the constitutional family
of Canada. Both the people of Canada and their leaders are fatigued
from a decade of constitutional wrangling, and it is doubtful that
there will be the will to rejoin the fray of constitutional talks.179 The
poll taken after the demise of the Meech Lake Accord was vindi-
cated with the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord. Seventy percent
of Canadians were against endorsing further concessions to Quebec,
even if it meant that Quebec would secede."' 0 Even Brian Mulroney,
who based his candidacy for Prime Minister in the restoration of
Quebec, has said that the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord would
be "the beginning of the process of dismantling Canada. 181
There are equally good indications that Quebec secession is un-
likely. Quebec is not homogeneously separatist, as has been demon-
strated by the 1980 sovereignty referendum, and by opinion polls
TORONTO STAR, Feb. 2, 1993, at A12.
176. James Mennie, Opponents Agree on Meaning of No; Breakup of Canada, MON-
TREAL GAZETTE, Sept. 24, 1992, at Al.
177. Wilhelmy Affair, supra note 162, at B3.
178. Quote. . Unquote, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Nov. 1, 1992, at B2.
179. Mennie, supra note 176, at Al.
180. See supra text accompanying note 126.
181. Wills, supra note 1, at B4.
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since the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord. 182
Perhaps most significantly, Quebec has inadvertantly demon-
strated that it can adequately promote its French culture within the
existing constitutional framework, and without a distinct society
clause. 183 Quebec's Bill 101, which stipulated that "French must be
the usual language of work, instruction, communication, trade, and
business in Quebec," was struck down in part by the Supreme Court
as an unreasonable limit on the freedom of expression in Article 2 of
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 8 " Premier Bourassa responded
by invoking the notwithstanding clause to pass a new law.' 85 That
new law was Bill 178, which prohibited the use of English on com-
mercial signs in Quebec.' 86
The speculation on the issue of Quebec secession should end no
later than 1994, the latest possible time for Quebec's next provincial
election. 187 Sovereignty will be the defining issue in that election, and
both main parties must consider their approach to this issue.'88 The
Parti Qu6b6cois has promised to draft a provisional Quebec constitu-
tion and hold a referendum on sovereignty within eight months of
election.8 9 Bourassa's Parti Lib6ral must move closer to a sovereign-
tist position if it hopes to win re-election. 90 The official policy of the
Parti Liberal, adopted in March of 1991, calls for political sover-
eignty should renewed federalism prove impossible. 191
The impossibility of renewed federalism may have been demon-
strated by the failure of the Charlottetown Accord. Thus, Canada
faces the prospect of a sovereigntist government in Quebec no later
that 1994, regardless of which party wins the impending provincial
182. See supra text accompanying note 68; Robert Gibbens, Tough Challenge for Que-
bec's Separatist Leaders, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at 4.
183. Dion, supra note 50, at 91.
184. Id.; Ford v. Quebec, 54 DLR 4th 577. Freedom of expression is found in Article 2
of the Charter, an article that is vulnerable to provincial override through the use of the not-
withstanding clause. See supra text accompanying note 87.
185. Dion, supra note 50, at 93.
186. Id. Provincial legislation passed through the use of the notwithstanding clause must
be affirmatively renewed every five years, or it will pass out of existence. Sandro Contenta,
Quebec's 200-year-old argument takes a new tack, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 24, 1993, at A17.
The five year waiver period on Bill 178 runs out in December of 1993, posing the incendiary
issue of whether or not to renew the French-only sign law. Id. The Quebec Conseil de la
Langue Francaise is considering a recommendation to the Quebec National Assembly that
small businesses be allowed to post bilingual signs. Id.
187. Don MacPherson, Cold Comfort; Referendum Result Shows Equality Party
Doomed, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Nov. 10, 1992, at B3.
188. Id.
189. Tu Than Ha, Quebec's No Vote is Distinct: Parizeau; 'We're Back on the High-
way, the Highway to Sovereignty', MONTREAL GAZETTE, Oct. 28, 1992, at Al; MacPherson,
supra note 187, at B3.
190. Sandro Contenta, Quebecers Enjoy Lull Before Sovereignty Storm, TORONTO
STAR, Nov. 1, 1992, at A10.
191. Sandro Contento, Bourassa Vows Tough War Against Separatist Wave, TORONTO
STAR, Oct. 27, 1992, at BI.
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election. 192
Canada also faces a definite change in leadership, and a possible
change in governments, at the federal level. Prime Minister Mulro-
ney announced his resignation as head of the Progressive Conserva-
tive Party on February 24, 1993.1a His party will select a new
leader to replace Mulroney as Prime Minister and lead the Conserv-
atives into the national elections in the fall of 1993.9
VI. Conclusion
The possibility of Quebec's secession is an issue that will only
unfold with time. The more immediate issue is the constitutional
strife that has consumed Canada for the last decade. Whatever harm
may be wrought by the conjectured secession of Quebec, it is clear
that the the constitutional wrangling over that possibility has already
harmed Canada. It has truly been a constitutional war, and as in any
other war, there has been attrition. The best example of that attri-
tion has been the infliction of the notwithstanding clause on the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. It is a hollow guarantee of
rights when a province can override freedom of expression, freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure, and the freedom from cruel
and unusual punishment. 195 By shackling such an urgent issue as ab-
original self-rule to the seemingly irreparable Quebec problem, the
recognition of aboriginal rights was unfairly delayed by the Charlot-
tetown Accord. Though neither Meech Lake nor Charlottetown were
ultimately ratified, they diverted the leaders of Canada from mun-
dane but very real problems such as the economy. The proposed
amendments illustrated a country's divisions in a vain attempt to
bring the country together. Pierre Trudeau's dream of a unified,
multicultural Canada is a worthy ideal, but if the cost of pursuing
that ideal has finally outweighed its benefits, it may be time to sur-
render the fight.
Jeffrey J. Cole
192. Some of the scenarios of a divided Canada deserve mention. On an economic level,
The Royal Bank of Canada has predicted that the breakup of Canada would result in a 16
percent drop in the standard of living by the year 2000. This translates into a loss in personal
income of as much as $3,200 per year. Plan's Fall, supra note 135, at IA.
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on the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the possible application of some of the
remaining provinces for U.S. statehood. Banting, supra note 10, at 176-77.
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